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WHAT JURIES CAN'T Do WELL: THE JURY'S
PERFORMANCE AS A RISK MANAGER
Reid Hastie* & W. Kip Viscusi**

I. INTRODUCTION
Can juries handle complex cases? One way to frame this question in
behavioral science terms is to ask: What tasks can juries perform well and what
tasks will they perform poorly? Our basic precept is that the legal system should
ask juries to perform tasks that they are good at performing and should not require
juries to carry out tasks that they cannot perform well.1 A second guiding theme in
our approach to the issue of jury competency is that the most relevant, most useful
analyses of jury performance are based on empirical observations and data, not on
rational analyses of hypothetical ideal situations.
A petit jury is a sample of non-expert lay people asked to reach majority
or unanimous consensus answers to legal questions. In general terms, jurors are
asked to perform one or more of the following tasks when they serve on criminal or
civil juries: (1) factfinder, to piece together the puzzle of historical truth; (2)
moralist, to represent and express the conscience of the community; (3)
disciplinarian, to punish societally proscribed behaviors in a just and effective
manner; and (4) accountant, to compensate a party who suffers harm, such that the
degree of compensation is intended to make the injured party whole again.
However, we often attribute other functions to the jury. For example, we expect
that the prospect of a jury trial can induce parties to resolve disputes or bargain
*
Reid Hastie, Professor of Psychology and Director of the Center for
Research on Judgment and Policy, University of Colorado (Boulder, CO 80309, telephone:
(303) 492-8122, electronic mail: Reid.Hastie@colorado.edu)
**
W. Kip Viscusi, Cogan Professor of Law and Economics and Director of the
Program on Empirical Legal Studies, Harvard Law School (Cambridge, MA 02138,
telephone: (617) 496-0019, electronic mail: kip@law.harvard.edu). The research reported in
this paper was supported by funds from the National Science Foundation, (Grant No. SBR
9410288), from the Exxon Co. USA, and the Harvard Olin Center for Law, Economics, and
Business; the conclusions in this report reflect the views of the authors and should not be
attributed to anyone else.
1.
But see Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on
Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALEL.J. 2071 (1998).
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charges and sentences rather than going to trial. From an even more elevated
perspective, the jury is supposed to protect citizens from abuse by corrupt political
officials, an overzealous prosecutor, or a prejudiced judge. The general acceptance
of verdicts by the citizenry is promoted (but obviously not guaranteed) by the
imprimatur of a decision made by a sample of citizens. Sometimes law and
economics scholars depict the jury as governors of a pricing mechanism
deliberately structured to control the behaviors of self-interested individuals in a
societal market in which benefits and costs are distributed. And one can view the
jury as a risk manager responsible for promoting an efficient and socially
2
acceptable level of risk-taking behavior by society's citizens and corporations.
Our assumption is that it is reasonable to conceive of some jury decisions
as serving the function of controlling risky behavior. Thus, for example, when a
jury is asked to consider exemplary or punitive damages to punish and deter
members of society from engaging in conduct that is in reckless disregard of the
risks to others, we view the judgment as involving social risk management. Thus
we ask: Can the jury perform in a manner so that it serves as an effective societal
risk manager? To avoid any pretense of suspense, we believe that this is an
extremely difficult function that is often not performed effectively even by the best
informed experts.3 The jury is ill-informed and poorly equipped to perform this
function. In our view, effective risk identification and management often requires
the application of technical, statistical, and scientific analytic tools that cannot be
effectively communicated to the unschooled layperson through expert testimony in
adversarial procedures. Furthermore, although an effective risk management policy
is founded on the detailed analysis of individual cases (for example, accidents and
non-accidents), it requires an omnibus consideration of the distribution of cases,
probabilities, benefits, and costs. In contrast, the tort jury trial focuses on a single
case, sampled from only one of the four cells of a hypothetical risk analysis matrix:
the too-few-precautions, harmful outcome cell.
We will rely on two reference points to determine the soundness of jury
behavior. First, it is possible to compare the jurors' decision with what would be
dictated under a correct interpretation of legal rules. Second, we will also analyze
the performance of juries in comparison to the performance of a sample of judges.
In particular, do judges perform more satisfactorily with respect to their handling
of the risk of accident issues and their assignment of liability than do the mock
jurors?
Our evaluation of juries will involve an assessment of their performance
with respect to a hypothetical railroad accident situation. In particular, we focus on
the legal institution of jury punitive damages decisions. We conceive of this
2.
See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An
Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 878-900, 955-56 (1998); W. Kip Viscusi, The
Social Costs of Punitive DamagesAgainst Corporationsin Environmentaland Safety Tort,
87 GEo. L (forthcoming Oct. 1998).
3.
STEPHEN G. BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIoUs CIRCLE: TOwARD EFFECTIVE
RISK REGULATION (1993); W. Kip ViscusI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBUC AND PRIVATE
REsPONSInILITIES FOR RISK (1992).
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institution as justified primarily by the impact of the jury decisions to efficiently
deter self-interested behaviors by individuals and (especially) corporations that
callously produce grave risks for others.4 Our focus is on the award of punitive
damages against parties who are charged with engaging in unconscionably reckless
conduct. Some prime examples would be environmental damage and product safety
tort suits. We are not concerned here with awards of punitive damages to punish
deliberately malicious conduct or to provide additional compensation to putatively
under-compensated plaintiffs.5 We nevertheless also have our doubts about the
competency of the jury to serve as an effective disciplinarian in those types of
decisions.
The issues that concern us have been raised by other observers. For
example, Federal Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook anticipated most of the6
arguments we will make in his concurring opinion in Carrollv. Otis Elevator Co.
In that case, a department store clerk was injured when an unidentified individual,
probably a child, pressed the emergency stop button on an escalator. The focal
issue for the jury concerned the foreseeability of misuse of the stop button and the
potential for its bright red color, designed to make the button salient for quick
action in an emergency, to attract children's attention. As Easterbrook wrote:
Why should escalator design be a question for juries?... Why
then ask them to identify defects after the fact?... Because the
expected costs of stops are small, designers make buttons easy to
find and press to reduce the costs of the rarer, but much more
serious, entanglements.... Come the lawsuit, however, the
passenger injured by a stop presents himself as a person, not a
probability. Jurors see today's injury; persons who would be
injured if buttons were harder to find and use are invisible....
Often [the jurors] succeed in suppressing their habits and
comparing the flesh-and-blood injury against potential losses, by
and large the system resolves products liability cases sensibly.
Yet no matter how conscientious jurors may be, there is a bias in
the system. Ex post claims are overvalued and technical
arguments are discounted in the process of litigation.7
Our present focus is on cases where the focal issue is the defendant's
recklessness. These are cases where the liability decision requires the jury to
provide a retrospective evaluation of the ex ante "foreseeable risk" and where ex

For disagreement, see WHMtAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
4.
ECONOMIC STRUCrURE OFTORT LAW 184-85 (1987); Sunstein et al., supra note 1, at 208185; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 2, at 878-900; Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic
Justice: Punitive Damagesand LegalPluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1393, 1425-28 (1993).
See, e.g., Peter Diamond, Efficiency Effects of Punitive Damages (Sept.
5.
1997) (working paper) (unpublished manuscript on file with author, available at Dept. of
Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Peter Diamond).
896 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1990).
6.
l at 215-16.
7.
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post overestimates of foreseeability can produce unjustified feelings of outrage and
punitiveness.

II. AN ORIGINAL EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JURY AND JUDGE
DECISIONS
The courts are subject to a variety of potential irrationalities involving
risk. Choices involving risk and uncertainty are notoriously difficult on a variety of
dimensions. The most distinctive aspect of how the courts address risk is that this
activity occurs after a harm has occured. Since judicial actions occur after the
damage has been inflicted rather than before, a critical concern is the extent to
which people have systematic biases in dealing with risk on an ex post basis as
opposed to making decisions involving the risk before the accident has in fact
occurred. Here we will report on original empirical evidence involving the
behavior of judges and mock jurors with respect to the same experimental
instrument. It will then be possible to compare this performance to assess the
relative biases of jurors as compared to judges.
We took a closer look at the hindsight effect in judgments of punitive
damages in two empirical studies that provide an assessment of the magnitude of
such effects in an environmental damage tort case. Our studies also allow us to
compare hindsight effects in judgments by citizens eligible for jury duty and active
judges. The judgment in which we were interested was presented to our hindsight
subjects via typical instructions on liability for punitive damages:$
You may award punitive damages only if you find that the
defendant's conduct
(1) was malicious; or
(2) manifested reckless or callous disregard for the
rights of others.
Conduct is malicious if it is accompanied by ill will, or
spite, or if it is for the purpose of injuring another.
In order for conduct to be in reckless or callous
disregard of the rights of others, four factors must be present.
First, a defendant must be subjectively conscious of a particular
grave danger or risk of harm, and the danger or risk must be a
foreseeable and probable effect of the conduct. Second, the
particular danger or risk of which the defendant was subjectively
conscious must in fact have eventuated. Third, a defendant must
have disregarded the risk in deciding how to act. Fourth, a
defendant's conduct in ignoring the danger or risk must have
8.
RONALD W. EADEs, JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON DAMAGES IN TORT AcTIONS 97153 (3d ed. 1993); Jardel Co. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518, 527-31 (Del. 1987). See Reid
Hastie et al., A Study of Jurorand Jury Judgments in Civil Cases: Deciding Liability for
PunitiveDamages, 22 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 287 (1998).
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involved a gross deviation from the level of care which an
ordinary person would use, having due regard to all the
circumstances.
Reckless conduct is not the same as negligence. Negligence is
the failure to use such care as a reasonable, prudent, and careful
person would use under similar circumstances. Reckless conduct
differs from negligence in that it requires a conscious choice of
action, either with knowledge of serious danger to others or with
knowledge of facts which would disclose the danger to any
reasonable person.
Two samples were used for this analysis. The mock-jurors consisted of
277 representative citizens who were recruited to participate in the analysis by a
professional survey research firm.9 The ninety-five judges who participated in the
study were part of the 1997 program in law and economics run by the University of
Kansas School of Law and Organizational Economics Center. The geographical
locales represented in the judges' sample were quite diverse, including state judges
throughout the country. The actual teaching of the programs where this survey was
distributed was in Copper Mountain, Colorado, and Sanibel, Florida. The judges in
this sample consisted of state court judges, including judges on state courts of
appeal and state supreme courts. Judges filled out the survey and returned it by
mail before participating in the educational program. They were told that
discussion of the survey would be an important part of the curriculum in which
they would be participating. The response rate was close to one-hundred percent.
Our experimental participants, both mock-jurors and judges, read the
summary of a fact situation in which a railroad company operating freight trains
along a section of track was ordered by the National Transportation Safety Board
to stop operations until the track was improved. In foresight conditions, the
participants were asked to decide if the railroad should be relieved of the order to
stop operations. In hindsight conditions, the railroad had continued to operate
legally (because the order had not gone into effect), an accident occurred that
caused damage to a river and to the residents and businesses along the river, and
the participants were asked to decide if the railroad should pay punitive damages
(in addition to the compensatory damages that had already been assessed). Care
was taken to align the instructions and the elements to be considered by the
decision maker in the foresight and hindsight conditions.
The survey asked the participants to render verdicts (either on the request
for relief from the order to stop operations or on liability for punitive damages), to
rate their confidence in their verdicts, to estimate prospective or retrospective
probabilities of the accident (under instructions to assume an ex ante perspective),
to judge whether there is (was) a grave danger or risk of harm that is (was) a
For details of the procedures, see Reid Hastie et al., Juror Judgments in Civil
9.
Cases: Hindsight Effects on Liability Judgments (1998) (unpublished technical report #376;
available at Center for Research on Judgment and Policy, University of Colorado, and on
file with author).
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foreseeable and probable effect of the existing condition of the railroad tracks
(again, with an ex ante perspective), and then to evaluate the quality of the decision
made by a jury that allowed the railroad to continue operations. As noted in Table
1, we separated the participants into four groups: jury-eligible citizens in foresight
and hindsight experimental conditions and judges, again in foresight and hindsight
conditions.
Mock-jurors showed massive hindsight effects on all relevant measures,
while judges showed trends in the direction of hindsight effects but of much
smaller (usually statistically insignificant) magnitudes. For example, in hindsight
67% of mock-jurors decided against the defendant railroad (concluding the railroad
was liable for punitive damages), while in foresight, only 33% decided against the
railroad (concluding that the order to stop operations should be maintained), a
difference that is statistically significant, x2 [1] = 29.18, p < 0.0001. In contrast,
25% ofjudges decided against the railroad in hindsight, 15% against in foresight (a
difference that is not statististically significant, x21] = 1.78, n.s.). We do not
intend to over-interpret the lack of "statistical significance" for verdict proportions
for the sample of judges. The differences we observed for judges were smaller than
for jurors (for example, a difference in anti-railroad verdicts of 0.10 versus 0.34
respectively) and, thus, we expect that there is truly a smaller hindsight effect in
judges' decisions. However, the effect would almost certainly have been
statistically significant for the judges' verdicts, if we had simply been able to study
a larger sample of judges.
A similar pattern appears in the measures of prospective and retrospective
probability of a serious accident, perception of the existence of a grave danger or
risk, and ratings of the quality of the decision and the decision maker who might,
hypothetically, decide to permit the railroad to continue operations: a large
(statistically significant) foresight-hindsight difference for the mock-jurors and a
small difference for judges. Although much smaller, the foresight-hindsight
differences were deemed statistically significant for some of the judges' ratings,
including the measures of probability of a serious accident (t[92] = 3.15, p < 0.01),
perception of the existence of a grave danger or risk (t[92] = 3.76, p < 0.001), and
the quality of the decision made by a jury that allowed the railroad to continue
operations (t[92] = 2.96, 0.01).
Under most conditions the verdicts were related to risk perceptions. Table
2 summarizes the proportions of respondents deciding against the railroad grouped
into quartiles according to their judgments of the probability that a serious accident
would occur. The relationships are quite strong for all groups except for the judges
making foresight, ex ante judgments. Since the rate of judgments against the
railroad was so low for this group (fifteen percent overall), the assessment of a
relationship between judgments and risk perceptions is insensitive.
The contrast between jurors' and judges' risk perceptions was not as stark,
however, as the pattern of anti-railroad judgments. In the hindsight case, both
citizens and judges predicted almost double the probability of a serious accident
than they had in foresight. The absolute difference in the judges' probability
assessments in the hindsight and foresight cases are, however, not as great as for
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the jurors. Overall, the differences between judges and jurors in the risk probability
assessments were not as strong as the differences in the pro-railroad judgments.
One possible interpretation of these results is that there is a difference between
judges and jurors not simply in the effect of hindsight on their risk beliefs, but also
in terms of how they interpret the rule of law as it should apply to accident cases
after the fact. As individual probability assessors, judges were also susceptible to
hindsight bias problems. However, the judges' greater experience in making legal
judgments made them less susceptible than the mock-jurors to hindsight biases.
Although our case materials were fictional and we cannot compare
estimates of probabilities to actual relative frequencies or some other index of wellcalibrated estimates, an internal consistency check is available in our experimental
situation. We can relate the participants' verdicts to their probability estimates to
see whether they are consistent with a standard for efficient deterrence promoted
by assuming an economic framework for the judgments.10 If deterrence is the sole
basis for the decisions and we assume that the probability of detecting the harm is
virtual certainty, the judgments of liability should be associated with probability
estimates that are related to the amount of the loss ($24 million in compensatory
damages in our case) and the cost of precautions (the $2.3 million cost to modify
the railroad tracks). Judge Learned Hand proposed this formula as the basis for
judgments of whether a defendant had breached the duty of reasonable care in
decisions concerning negligence.,' If an accident's cost multiplied by its
probability of occurrence exceeds the cost of untaken precautions, then in the event
of a mishap, the defendant should be judged at least negligent. For example, if a
respondent estimated the probability of a serious accident to be .25, then the cost of
the untaken precaution ($2.3 million) should be less than .25 x $24 million (the
loss sustained in the accident) to justify deciding liability, much less warranting the
award of punitive damages. In this example calculation, the expected loss would be
$6 million. The precaution should thus be taken (that is, $6 million is greater than
$2.3 million; a shortcut test is to observe whether the respondent estimates the
probability of an accident as greater than 0.096 (2.3 million/24 million)).
Examining whether in the view of the respondent the railroad was
negligent is interesting, but negligence is not tantamount to meeting the more
stringent conditions for the award of punitive damages. Indeed, a more detailed
analysis of the assessed expected benefits of taking the safety precautions and the
costs of these precautions indicates that simply violating the negligence test
threshold was not sufficient for the sample of judges to award punitive damages.
Table 3 summarizes the correlation of the benefit and cost calculations with the
probability of ruling against the railroad. For the purposes of these calculations, the
assessed benefits of the safety improvement consist of the individual judges'
assessed probabilities of a serious accident multiplied by the $24 million loss
(compensatory damages) figure. This loss amount was known to the judges in the

John P. Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD.
10.
A.POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (4th ed. 1992).
RICHARD
(1973);
323
11.

United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2nd Cir. 1947); Mark F.

Grady, Untaken Precautions,18 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1989); Brown, supra note 10.
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expost scenario, but not in the ex ante scenario. The benefit-cost ratio simply gives
the ratio of these expected costs to the cost of the repairs, which was $2.3 million.
The net benefit calculations in Table 3 give the difference between the expected
benefits and the costs. The structure of the table organizes these responses in terms
of different quartiles of the benefit-cost ratio range. For the first quartile, the
benefit-cost ratio ranges from 0 to 1.04. Subsequent quartiles consider higher
benefit-cost ratio amounts.
Consider first the results for the ex post scenario in Table 3, which is the
sample for which the loss amounts were known. It is quite striking that for the half
of the sample for whom the benefit-cost ratio was 3.6 or less, none of these judges
took an anti-railroad position. For higher benefit-cost ratios of the upper two
quartiles, approximately half of the judges ruled against the railroad. A benefit-cost
spread must surpass negligence before the judges award punitive damages. In no
case in which the benefit-cost ratio was not substantial (that is, less than 3.6) did a
judge favor a punitive award.
The citizen, mock-jurors' judgments provide a further interesting test of
whether the respondents' rulings were sensitive to benefit-cost factors. One group
of citizens was presented case materials in which the amount of loss (compensatory
damages) was relatively low ($240,000) while another group was told the loss was
high ($24 million, the same loss amount that was presented to the judges). Benefitcost statistics, like those calculated for the judges, are presented for the two groups
of jurors in Table 3. First, there is no significant difference between the rates at
which members of the two experimental groups, low versus high damages, ruled
against the railroad (.66 versus .68 respectively). Second, the benefit-cost ratio is
correlated with the probability of ruling against the railroad within each group
(both series of values increase together in an orderly manner in Table 3). Focusing
on the quartiles in Table 3 potentially provides a depiction of juror bahavior that
more closely parallels the judges than is in fact the case. The linkage of the benefitcost ratios to the probability of ruling against the railroad is more telling. In the
judges' hindsight case, no judge with an assessed benefit-cost ratio of below 3.65
ruled against the railroad. For the jurors' low damage case, all jurors with a
benefit-cost ratio of at least 0.09 ruled against the railroad. However, for the juror's
high damage case, only 26% ruled against the railroad when the benefit-cost ratio
was 0.21-3.86, and it is not until the benefit-cost ratio reaches 8.87 that 100% of
the jurors oppose the railroad. Different quartiles of jurors in the low and high
damage scenarios are similarly disposed toward the railroad, but these attitudes are
largely unaffected by differences in the scale of the damages in the two instances.
As would be expected from the lack of differences in verdict rates between the low
and high damages groups, the absolute value of the benefit-cost ratio is not related
to verdicts between the two groups; the anti-railroad rulings are associated with
tiny ratios in the low damages group and, in the high damages group, there are a
substantial number of anti-railroad rulings (26%) even in the quartile of
respondents with the lowest (less than 3.86) ratios. The economic calculations of
costs and benefits suggest that judges have a sense of rationality in situations
believed to create the most irrationality. In contrast, the citizen, mock-jurors do not
appear to be sensitive to benefit-cost relationships.
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I. A REVIEW OF EMPIICAL STUDIES OF LAY JUDGMENTS OF
UNCERTAIN RISKS
Juries hate .scientific evidence.
They think they won't be able to understand it so
naturally they can't understand it. As soon as you step into the
box you see a curtain of obstinate incomprehension clanging
down over their minds. What they want is certainty. Did this
paint particle come from this car body? Answer yes or no. None
of those nasty mathematical probabilities we're so fond of.
If they hate scientific evidence they certainly hate
arithmetic more. Give them a scientific opinion that depends on
the ability to divide a factor by two-thirds and what do you get
from counsel? 'I'm afraid you'll have to explain yourself more
simply, Mr. Middlemass. The jury12 and I haven't got a higher
degree in mathematics, you know."
The hindsight bias exhibited by jurors in the railroad case is not the only
likely failing of lay judgments in accident cases. A survey of what is known about
laypeople's judgments of risks provides many reasons to expect that retrospective
judgments of recklessness, liability, and deterrence will be erratic and unreliable.
First, ex ante decisions involving risk and uncertainty are notoriously difficult.
Reasoning under uncertainty is much more difficult than under certainty and leads
to many inconsistencies and inaccuracies. 13 These errors will affect the behavior of
people on the street, in corporate offices, and in the jury box. Which of these many
errors will apply to any particular decision depends heavily on the character of the
decision, the manner in which the risk-relevant question is framed, and the
pertinent background information and attitudes of the decision maker.
A. IrrationalResponses to Small ProbabilitiesandPremiumsfor Zero Risk
Many biases in risk perception stem from the fundamental nature of risk.
A flood of empirical results and interpretations has demonstrated that people are
not well-endowed to reason coherently about the probabilities of occurrence of
individual events. 14 Studies of juries' competency in comprehending and applying
probabilistic evidence have also concluded that jurors are very limited in this

12.

P.D. JAMES, DEATH Op AN EXPERT WrrNEss at 96 (1977).

13.

Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:

Heuristicsand Biases, 185 Sc. 1124 (1974); Viscusi, supra note 3.
See, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 13. Although they may reason
14.
more coherently about the frequencies, rather than probabilities, of classes of uncertain

events, also see Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Are Humans Good Intuitive Statisticians
After All? Rethinking Some Conclusions from the Literature on Judgment Under

Uncertainty,58 COGNrrON 1 (1996); Gerd Gigerenzer & Ulrich Hoffrage, How to Improve
Bayesian Reasoning Without Instruction: Frequency Formats, 102 PSYCHOL REv. 684

(1995).
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regard and that, by and large, information about probabilities
misunderstood and misused1 5

is often

For low probability events that have been called to people's attention,
people usually overestimate the level of the risk. Small identified risks tend to be
overestimated, and large identified risks tend to be underestimated. 16 There is also
an "out of sight, out of mind" phenomenon in judgments of unidentified risks (for
example, "...and all other factors that might lead to a failure of the shuttle
launch"), such that unidentified events tend to be ignored or to be assigned
underestimated probabilities. 17 To the extent that accidents and major catastrophes
involve small probability events, the tendency will be to overestimate their
likelihoods once these events are called to people's attention. In situations of
complete ignorance of the risk, people will tend to underestimate the extent of the
hazard.
One practical consequence of these habits of probability judgment for jury
assessments of defendants' risk actions is that jurors will perceive relevant
identified risks to be larger than they are. Defendants (for example, corporations)
will attempt to avoid these risks more than they would and should if the risk levels
were properly understood. Because juries make their judgments ex post, after an
accident or catastrophe has occurred, the tendency will be to overestimate the
likelihood of accidents involving small probabilities, reflecting the observed
pattern of systematic biases in perception of risk. One consequence will be that
parties, whose behavior is responsive to jury verdicts, will be motivated to adopt

15.
D. H. Kaye & Jonathan J. Koehler, Can Jurors UnderstandProbabilistic
Evidence?, 154 J. ROYAL STAT. Soc'y, SERLs A 75 (1991); Jonathan J. Koehler, One in
Millions, Billions, and Trillions: Lessons from People v. Collins (1968) for People v.
Simpson (1995), 47 J. LEGAL ED. 214 (1997); Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel N. Shaviro,
Veridical Verdicts: Increasing Verdict Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic
Evidence and Methods, 75 CORNELL.L. REv. 247 (1990); Brian C. Smith et al., Jurors' Use
of ProbabilisticEvidence, 20 LAW & HUM. BEmAv. 49 (1996); William C. Thompson, Are
Juries Competent To EvaluateStatisticalEvidence?, 52 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn
1989, at 9.
16.
Sarah Lichtenstein et al., Judged Frequency of Lethal Events, 4 J. ExPER.
PSYCHOL: HUM. LEARING MEMORY 551 (1978); Paul Slovic, Perceptionof Risk, 236 ScI.
280 (1987). This pervasive empirical relationship has been incorporated into theories of risk
evaluation as an assumption about weighting of outcomes, see, for example, Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
ECONOMEmRICA 263 (1979); R. Duncan Luce, Rank-Dependent,Subjective Expected-Utility
Representations, 1 J. RISK UNCERTAINTY 305 (1988); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RIsK
UNCERTAINTY 297 (1992); Elke U. Weber, From Subjective Probabilities to Decision
Weights: The Effect of Asymmetric Loss Functions on the Evaluation of Uncertain'
Outcomes and Events, 115 PSYCHOL. BULL 228 (1994), or as the result of a rational, but
conservative Bayesian learning process, see, for example, Viscusi, supranote 3.

17.

HowARD KUNREuTHm Er AL., DiSAsT R INSURANCE PROTEcION: PUBLIC

POLICY LESSONS 235-43 (1978).
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inefficiently high levels of precautionary actions. Overcoming this fundamental
bias will be difficult, if not impossible, for juries to do.
A counterpart to the overestimation of small probabilities is that people
will be willing to pay a premium for the certainty of obtaining "zero risk." Because
people overestimate small probabilities, decreasing the risk from a small
probability to zero will have a greater effect on the perceived risk reduction than
would a risk decrease of the same magnitude that was not sufficient to reach zero.
For example, studies of consumer valuations of risk reduction have indicated that
reducing the risk of injury from household chemical products from 5/10,000 to
zero has a much greater value to consumers than decreasing the risk level from
15/10,000 to 5/10,000.18 The latter risk reduction is twice the size of the reduction
offered that reached zero, but consumers valued it less. Economic predictions
imply that people should have a diminishing willingness to pay for excessive
reductions in risk, but in practice the last reduction in risk that reduces the level to
zero has an extremely high subjective value. The appeal of zero risk leads
government officials to declare that our food is "safe," rather than reporting
19 that
only a small number of Americans will be killed by food poisoning this year.
We would expect this "zero risk mentality" to also influence jury
behavior. To the extent that juries exhibit a certainty premium, they will value the
complete elimination of risk by more than is warranted given its objective benefits
in risk reduction. Similarly, departures from zero risk will be viewed as more
grievous offenses than they are. Juries will inappropriately undervalue a party's
efforts to reduce risk to a small, but still non-zero level. Again, this relationship
arises because of the bias in the perception of risks; the overestimation of small
probabilities in effect flattens the relationship between actual risks and perceived
risks so that changes in perceived risk levels are less than changes in actual risk
levels. People overestimate small risks and underestimate large risks. The
subjective, perceived probability curve is flatter than the objective probability
curve. Consequently, juries tend to underestimate the extent of the risk reduction a
defendant has achieved and overestimate the importance of further risk reductions
that may reach the zero risk level. Thus, juries will be unfairly biased against
defendants in cases involving risk and uncertainty.
B. Outcomes Versus Probabilities
It is important to distinguish between probabilities and consequences. The
probability of an event is the likelihood that it will occur; the payoff refers to the
magnitude of its consequences. However, under many conditions, people seem to
confuse the two components. For example, large losses can affect the perceptions
of the preventability of an accident. However, the existence of substantial ex post
losses does not imply that the ex ante probability was high or that this probability
An Investigation of the Rationality of Consumer
W. Kip Viscusi et al.,
18.
Valuations of Multiple Health Risks, 18 RAND J. ECON. 465, 473-77 (1987).
See also BREYER, supra note 3, at 11-19, 39-42, on the "90:10 Principle" in
19.
risk reduction expenditures and the extreme wording of some government regulations, for
example "The Delaney Clause," 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1994) (food additives).
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was easy (or difficult) to manipulate through preventative actions. The correct test
of whether a firm, sued for liability for an accident, took an efficient degree of care
should be based on a comparison of whether the cost of the relevant precaution is
less than the change in risk probability that would have resulted from the
precaution multiplied by the expected amount of the loss. However, making such a
judgment requires that juries be able to view the situation ex ante, before the
accident, and to make the risk calculations uninfluenced by the knowledge that the
accident has in fact occurred.
C. IrrationalResponses to Novel Risks
The particular character of the risk also plays an important role in
perceptions and subjective evaluations. People overreact to risks associated with
new technologies; to risks that represent increases from accustomed, status quo risk
levels; to risks outside of their personal control; and to risks associated with highly
publicized events. 20 What is notable is that all of these elements are likely to be
present in the accidents and illnesses that are the focus of many cases that involve
punitive damages and result in the most dramatic awards.
Consider, for example, litigation involving asbestos or other industrial
chemicals, breast implants, or oil spills. Asbestos and other chemical (for example,
Agent Orange) risks have been highly publicized, are outside of the control of the
exposed individuals, and involve risks that workers were not fully cognizant of at
the time they incurred the risk because of evolving scientific knowledge. Breast
implants involve a new technology with novel risks that were not present before the
advent of this technology, the women who received these transplants incurred risks
that were outside of their personal control, and the risks have generated
considerable publicity. The Exxon Valdez oil spill was a highly publicized event
that was outside of the control of those who suffered the greatest losses and that
resulted from the deployment of a new technology-drilling for and transporting
oil in Alaska. Even though the character of each of these risks has its distinctive
aspects-personal injury, financial loss, environmental damage-the biases against
the defendants' behavior will be similar. People tend to overreact to the risk,
manifested in excessive responses by the jury, which has been asked to play the
role of a societal risk manager when judging liability and assessing damage awards.
D. IrrationalResponses to Ambiguous Risks
Another form of irrationality was illustrated dramatically in the wellknown Ellsberg Paradox. People prefer a precisely understood probability of
winning a prize to an equivalent ambiguous, uncertain chance of the same outcome.
The counterpart to this effect in the case of losses is ambiguity aversion. Studies of
attitudes towards ambiguous risks and uncertain environmental damage show that
people prefer precisely understood risks of losses to more ambiguous prospects,
even though the average probability of the losses has been carefully equated. For
example, people would rather face a well-defined chance of an adverse
20.

See VISCUSI, supra note 3.
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consequence of 2/1000, rather than a 50:50 chance that the chance is either 1/1000
or 3/1000.
This pattern of ambiguity aversion will make parties overly cautious in
situations involving ambiguity, even more so than in situations with precisely
estimated levels of risk. However, if a party is unfortunate enough to experience an
adverse outcome, then juries will tend to be especially unforgiving when the ex
ante risk was ambiguous. There is a bias against uncertain risks; people respond as
if they were greater than they are. Given this bias, juries are likely to be excessively
demanding when judging situations of uncertainty; they will view the risks incurred
by a defendant as being greater, and hence judge behavior as more likely to have
been reckless, because risks were uncertain. Thus, a paradox results: situations of
ambiguity, in which precautionary behavior will be especially difficult because of
the ill-defined character of the risks, should be judged by more lenient liability
standards. But, to the contrary, juries will be inclined to be particularly harsh in
situations of ambiguity and uncertainty.
E. Prejudice Against Benefit-Cost Analysis
One byproduct of juries' mistrust and confusion about probabilistic
reasoning is an ingrained hostility towards rational, mathematical analyses of
benefits and costs in the domain of risk. The adverse affect of this prejudice is to
discourage companies and other risk-takers from doing the kinds of risk
management analyses that have proven to be most effective. Ideally, the jury in its
role as a risk manager should promote the rational analyses of risk and safety by
the parties who may end up in litigation following adverse events. More
specifically, the objective should be to maintain a sensible benefit-cost tradeoff.
Safety improvements should be pursued so long as the expected benefits to society
exceed the costs. These benefits considered should include factors in addition to
financial consequences, such as considerations of health-risk reductions,
environmental impact, and perhaps other non-market factors that are affected by
the increased degree of care by corporations and other actors. The benefit-cost
tradeoff simply requires that safety efforts be undertaken so long as they are in
society's best interests.
As Judge Easterbrook has observed, companies incorporate such safety
concerns in a manner that recognizes the pertinent tradeoffs. 21 Firms routinely
perform cost-effectiveness analyses of their products and procedures. Such studies
include accounts of the costs of injury and the costs of production. But, as Judge
Easterbrook noted, the jury tends to take a very narrow view with a focus on the
injured person in court, not on the invisible members of the rest of society who will
be affected (often positively) by the defendant's response to tort liability outcomes.
Thus, the defendants are likely to take a broader societal perspective on costs and
benefits, while jurors focus on case specifics.

Shirley Carroll v. Otis Elevator Co., 896 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1990). See also
21.
Max Boot, YourMoney or YourLife? That Depends, WALLST. J., Mar. 4, 1998, at A18.
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Making precise assessments of costs and benefits of safety actions is often
feasible through the application of the developing science of benefit-cost analysis.
For example, Ford Motor Company and General Motors routinely make explicit
calculations regarding the costs and benefits of providing various safety devices,
such as shielded gas tanks, reinforcing struts, anti-skid brakes, etc. (for example,
the Ford Pinto; the Oldsmobile Cutlass). Making such calculations appears to
offend some jurors' sensibilities. Post-trial interviews with jurors provide evidence
that the plaintiff's introduction of corporations' calculations and benefit-cost
memos provokes hostility and punitive attitudes. 22 However, thinking about risks
rigorously is exactly what organizations should do so that they can strike a
reasonable balance between costs and benefits. 3 In the Ford Pinto case, we may
end up believing that Ford's conclusions undervalued safety.2 However, the
company should be applauded for its efforts to grapple systematically with the cost
and safety implications of its actions. Only by making these tradeoffs explicit
25 can
we learn from our experiences to make more sensible tradeoffs in the future.
F. Hindsight
A pitfall for juries making their decisions after the fact is that they may
incorrectly assess a defendant's ex ante knowledge of the risk. With the benefit of
hindsight, jurors may infer that the defendant had full information but simply did
not care enough about safety to take more precautions. If a juror uses the postaccident reference point as the basis to determine how defendants should select
their safety levels, a higher level of precaution will seem optimal than one based on
the actual imperfect pre-accident state of knowledge. The ex post perspective in the
courtroom will consequently overestimate the magnitude of the punitive damages
necessary to align the incentives for the defendant with levels of punishment that
are needed to prodice efficient degrees of care. Ideally, a jury should evaluate a
defendant's decision based on the degree of risk information available before the
accident. But, as Judge Easterbrook noted, "The 'ex post' perspective of litigation
exerts a hydraulic force that distorts judgment."2 Hindsight biases lead to
excessive penalties for defendants if juries overstate the defendants' degree of
knowledge prior to the accident or other unfortunate event that resulted in a law
suit.
Putting aside such hindsight biases may be difficult for a jury to do. It is
likely that our capacities to make judgments under uncertainty were designed by
22.
Boot, supra note 21, at A18.
23.
W. KIPViscusi, REFORMING PRODUCTS LiABILrTY 112-13 (1991).
24.
The Ford Company documents summarizing the risk calculations, originally
E.F. Grush & C.S. Saundby, FatalitiesAssociated with Crash-Induced Fires and Fuel
Leakages, (internal documents of Ford Motor Co., 1973), are reprinted in BRENT FISSE &
JOHN BRArHWAITE, THE IMPACr OF PUBuCrrY ON CORPORATE OFFENDERS 41-54 (1983).
See also Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERs L. REV. 1013

(1991).
25.
26.

Viscusi, supra note 2.
Otis Elevator,896 F.2d at 215.
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evolutionary selection to operate in a forward-looking, predictive fashion. Even
today, few judgments demand retrospective, hindsight-free vision. However, one of
the few of such socially important judgments is that required by our civil justice
system when one party sues another for damages following an accident. Hindsight
effects have been documented in almost every domain of everyday and
professional judgment. 27 A few empirical studies have even explored hindsight
effects on jurors' judgments and the implications of the phenomenon in legal
decisions.2
An exemplary study of hindsight in judgments of liability was conducted
by Kamin and Rachlinski. 29 They asked college students to judge negligence before
and after a barge collided with a drawbridge causing damage to property along a
river. In foresight, the participants were asked to decide if a city should hire a
bridge operator during winter months when the danger of flooding was relatively
low. In hindsight, the participants were presented with an accident that would
certainly have been averted had an operator been hired and asked to judge
retrospectively whether the city was negligent for not hiring the operator. In
foresight only 24% of the participants chose to hire the operator, but in hindsight
57% believed the city should have hired the operator. The participants were also
asked to estimate the probability that an accident would occur prospectively or

27.

Jay J. J. Christensen-Szalanski & Cynthia F. Willhan, The HindsightBias: A

Meta-Analysis, 48 ORG. BEHAv. HUM. DECISION PROCESS 147 (1991); Baruch Fischhoff,

Hindsight o Foresight:The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty,
1

J. EXPERMmNTAL PSYCHOL: HUM. PERCEPTION PERFORMANCE

288 (1975); Scott A.

Hawkins & Reid Hastie, Hindsight: Biased Judgments of Past Events After the Outcomes
Are Known, 107 PSYCHOL. BuLL 311 (1990).
See, e.g., Hal R. Arkes, Principlesin Judgment/Decision Making Research
28.
Pertinentto Legal Proceedings,7 BEHAv. SCL & L. 429 (1989); Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A.
Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. The Business Judgment Rule: Differences in Hindsight
Bias, 73 OR. L. REv. 587 (1994); Galen V. Bodenhausen, Second-Guessing the Jury:
Stereotypic and Hindsight Biases in Perceptions of Court Cases, 20 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL 1112 (1990); Jonathan D. Casper et al., Cognitions, Attitudes and DecisionMaking in Search and Seizure Cases, 18 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 93 (1988); Jonathan D.
Casper et al., JurorDecision Making, Attitudes, and the HindsightBias, 13 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 291 (1989); Dorothy K. Kagehiro et al., Hindsight Bias and Third-Party
Consentorsto Warrantless Police Searches, 15 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 305 (1991); Kim A.
Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post e Ex Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight, 19
LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 89 (1995); Susan J. LaBine & Gary LaBine, Determinations of
Negligence and the Hindsight Bias, 20 LAw & HuM. BEHAv. 501 (1996); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. C. L. REv.
571 (1998); Jennifer K. Robbenholt & Mark S. Sobus, An Integration of Hindsight Bias
and Counterfactural Thinking: Decision-Making and Drug Courier Profiles, 21 LAW &
HuM. BEHAV. 539 (1997); David B. Wexler & Robert F. Schopp, How and When to Correct
for Juror Hindsight Bias in Mental Health Malpractice Litigation: Some Preliminary
Observations,7 BEHAV. SCr. & L. 485 (1989).
Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 28.
29.
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retrospectively, and the estimates were significantly higher in hindsight than in
foresight.
The experimenters also tested the efficacy of a warning from the judge to
the mock-juror about potential hindsight effects:
As we all know, hindsight vision is always 20/20. Therefore it is
extremely important that before you determine the probability of
the outcome that did occur, you fully explore other possible
alternative outcomes which could have occurred. Please take a
moment to think of all the ways in which the event in question
may have happened differently or not at all.3°
But, this instruction had no appreciable effect on any judgments or ratings.
Unfortunately, this result may be general. No general remedies are known for
hindsight effects. Extensive experience in a domain of activity and training in the
deliberate application of probability and risk analysis methods may be the only
effective procedures. Neither of these countermeasures is a practical possibility to
improve jury performance.
IV. CONCLUSION
Situations of risk and uncertainty pose considerable difficulties for
individual decision makers and for government risk managers. It is not surprising
that the courts would also have difficulties in this regard. Conceptualizing low
probability events and making sensible benefit-cost tradeoffs is often a difficult
task. Here we have summarized many of the potential pitfalls in dealing with risk
and have demonstrated in detail how the problems of hindsight bias may
contaminate jury decisions.
The results from the studies involving our original sample of judges and
citizens indicate that judges were better able to deal with risk judgments made in
hindsight than were the citizens. The mock-jurors were much more willing to levy
punitive damages for a railroad accident case after the fact, while in the same
situation before the accident occurred, similarly informed jurors did not believe
that the proposed safety precaution should be adopted. In contrast, the judges
expressed a more consistent view than did the jurors and were less likely to impose
punitive sanctions. This difference in legal judgments, comparing jurors and
judges, appears to be stronger than the analogous differences in risk assessments.
This implies that it may be application of the rules of law, as opposed to
perceptions of risk, that is differentially affected by hindsight biases in the two
groups.
In terms of a policy direction, these results suggest that greater reliance on
the authority of judges would improve judicial decision making. Policy measures
that give judges the authority to set punitive damages and to influence the
functioning of the judicial system with respect to risk decisions could potentially
improve the quality of these outcomes. The present structure will not simply make
30.

IM. at 97.
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random errors but will in fact impose a systematic bias by levying excessive
penalties on companies for whom the accident lottery has turned out unfavorably.
The primary conclusion from our empirical study is that juries perform
poorly when making the decisions required to assess liability for punitive
damages.31 Our empirical findings provide one more argument against the current
form of punitive damages procedures: massive hindsight effects appeared in our ex
ante versus ex post comparisons. This is no surprise given the prevalence of
hindsight effects across all decision domains and their occurrence in similar
judgments of liability under standards of negligence. 32 What is perhaps more
informative is our finding that judges exhibit much smaller hindsight effects when
asked to make identical judgments.
Our attitude about jury reform is conservative in that we do not advocate
removing decisions from the jury unless strong evidence has been adduced
showing that those decisions are made poorly. However, we also resist the tortcentric view that places as much societal discretion as possible in the realm of
litigation. In the case of decisions involving evaluations of risk, especially where
the judgment requires the decision maker to infer ex ante risk estimates from an ex
post perspective, the typical juror appears to be subject to a massive hindsight bias.
We also know of no practical methods that could be used to de-bias the juror in
such a situation. Our conclusion is that we should change the nature of the requisite
decision or assign the task to a different decision maker.
When someone claims that the jury is performing poorly, it is important to
ask, "Compared to what?" Our sample of experienced trial-judges' liability
decisions supports the recommendation that these hindsight-prone decisions be
assigned to judges rather than jurors. The judges were much more consistent than
the jurors in their decisions on the defendant railroad company's need to take
safety precautions in our legal judgment scenarios. In foresight, 15% of the judges
decided against the railroad's position, and in hindsight, 25% decided against the
railroad, a trend in the direction of hindsight bias, but a much smaller difference
than for jurors (33% against in foresight, 67% against in hindsight). Although
judges are not perfect on this decision, they are much better than jurors.
It is interesting to ask what factors make judges less subject to hindsight
effects than jurors. Our speculation is that several aspects of experience on the
bench contribute to the superior performance of judges: judges see many cases in
which the parties' risk assessments play a role, they see opposing sides many times,
they see who wins, and they can observe which cases get overturned on appeal. All
of these factors are likely to lead judges to be better informed, to reason in a more
systematic manner, and to more fully consider both sides of the case than jurors. It
is even possible that the performance of judges can be improved by adding
information from professional risk analysis experts at trial, perhaps in the form of
expert testimony.

31.
32.

See Hastie et al., supra note 8.
Id.
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An alternative to taking the decision away from the jury might be to
recommend changes in the nature of the decision, the grounds for concluding
punitive damages are warranted. For example, other commentators have suggested
that hindsight effects might be ameliorated if the judgment is focused on the degree
to which the defendant's alleged actions depart from a reasonable or customary
standard of care, rather than on a reconstructed ex ante state of foreknowledge and
intention.33 However, without further empirical tests of alternate procedures, we are
reluctant to speculate about what might 'fix" the decision. For all we know,
hindsight effects might also distort judgments focused on reasonable standards of
care.
A final possibility would be to simply abolish punitive damages
judgments of all kinds. This is the policy in four state jurisdictions, and the most
relevant empirical evidence shows that the situation of safety and social costs due
to various uncertain hazards and risks is no different in those states than in the
other forty-six2 4 Perhaps it is a good time, given the substantial doubts we and
others have raised about the quality of jury punitive damages judgments, to rethink
the entire institution and to seriously explore the option of abolition and a shift to
non-tort-centric risk management.

Cf Rachlinski, supra note 28.
Viscusi, supra note 2.
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Table 1
Summary of Participants' Judgments

Judges

Citizens

Measures

(n =175)

Foresight
(n =47)

Hindsight
(n =47)

33%

67%

15%

25%

-29.61

+31.07

-40.00

-30.85

Probability of a Serious
Accident (0... 1.00)

.34

.59

.20

.36

"Is (Was) There a Grave
Danger or Risk?" ("No":
0.. .9: "Yes")

3.50

6.08

2.45

4.28

Rating of the Quality of Jury
Decision to Allow the
Railroad to Continue
Operations (lowest: -3...+3:
highest)

+0.96

-0.33

+1.73

+0.96

Rating of the Competency of
Jury that Allowed the
Railroad to Continue
Operations (lowest: 0... 100:
highest)

66.55

53.00

64.06

54.89

Verdicts (percent "antirailroad")
Verdicts Scaled by
Confidence (most confident
pro-railroad: -100...+100:
most confident anti-railroad)

Foresight

Hindsight

(n =102)
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Table 2
Correlation of Risk Perceptions with Probability of Ruling Against Railroad
Judges, Foresight (47 observations)
Risk Perception
Percentile Range

Probability
Range

Probability of Ruling Against
Railroad

0.10
0.00-0.05
00-21 (n=10)
0.13
0.10-0.10
22-55 (n=16)
0.30
0.15-0.20
56-76 (n=10)
0.09
0.25-0.95
77-100 (n=l 1)
t-statistic (for vs. against railroad) = 0.29, d.f. = 45, not significant
Judges, Hindsight (47 observations)
Risk Perception
Percentile Range

Probability
Range

Probability of Ruling Against
Railroad

0.05-0.10
00-25 (n=12)
0.15-0.30
26-49 (n=11)
0.35-0.50
1
50-76 (n=13)
0.60-0.85
77-100 (n=11)
t-statistic (for vs. against railroad) = 5.76, d.f. = 45, p < .001

0.00
0.00
0.23
0.73
confidence level

Jurors, Foresight (102 observations)
Risk Perception
Percentile Range

Probability
Range

Probability of Ruling Against
Railroad

0.12
0.00-0.10
00-33 (n=34)
0.12
0.15-0.20
33-50 (n=17)
0.40
1
0.25-0.50
51-77 (n=28)
0.79
0.55-1.00
78-100 (n=23)
t-statistic (for vs. against railroad) = 5.97, d.f. = 100, p < .001 confidence level
Jurors, Hindsight (175 observations)
Risk Perception
Percentile Range

Probability
Range

Probability of Ruling Against
Railroad

0.26
0.02-0.37
00-28 (n=49)
0.53
0.40-0.60
29-53 (n-45)
0.89
0.65-0.80
54-83 (n=52)
1.00
0.85-1.00
84-100 (n=36)
t-statistic (for vs. against railroad) = 9.96, d.f. = 173, p < .001 confidence level
Table 3
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Correlation of Implicit Net Benefits and Benefit-Cost Ratios (B/C) with Probability
of Ruling Against Railroad
Judges (Hindsight, 47 observations)
B/C Percentile
Range

Net Benefit

B/C

Probability of Ruling
Against Railroad

00-25 (n=12)

-1.10-0.10

0.52-1.04

0.00

26-49 (n=11)

1.30-4.90

1.57-3.13

0.00

50-76 (n=13)

6.10-9.70

3.65-5.22

0.23

77-100 (n=l)

12.10-18.10

6.26-8.87

0.73

Jurors, Low Damages (82 observations)
B/C Percentile
Range

Net Benefit

B/C

Probability of Ruling
Against Railroad

00-28 (n=23)

-2.29-2.20

.00-.04

0.22

29-53 (n=21)

-2.19-2.14

.04-.07

0.71

54-81 (n=23)

-2.13-2.11

.07-.08

0.91

82-100 (n=15)

-2.10-2.06

.09-.10

1.00

B/C Percentile
Range

Jurors, High Damages (93 observations)
B/C
Probability of Ruling
Net Benefit
Against Railroad

00-24 (n=23)

-1.82-6.58

0.21-3.86

0.26

25-50 (n=24)

7.30-12.10

4.17-6.26

0.54

51-77 (n=25)

13.30-16.90

6.78-8.35

0.84

78-100 (n=21)

18.10-21.70

8.87-10.44

1.00
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